Close To Torah

Yosef HaTzaddik was in jail for a crime that he didn’t do. The butler and the baker both had a dream that seemed to tie into the outcome of their trials. Yosef saw that they were down and offered to help them. He told the butler that Pharaoh would soon remove him from prison and that he would be back to serving drinks in no time; the baker would be executed. They recognized the validity of Yosef’s interpretations and were amazed. Before the butler was freed, Yosef said to him (Bereishis 40:14-15), “please remember the kindness that I did for you and mention me favorably before Pharaoh so that I can get out of jail. I was kidnapped from my Jewish family and I was placed in jail under false accusations.” This would not be the case; the butler forgot about him immediately and whenever he tried to recall him, Hashem made him forget it again (Bereishis Rabbah 88:7). Chazal say that Yosef was punished with two more years in jail because of his request to the butler.

The famous question is: What did Yosef do wrong? Was he expected to pass up the opportunity to have someone speak on his behalf to Pharaoh? Are we not required to do our part in trying to get things done? Additionally, the Midrash (Bereishis Rabbah 88:3) makes a perplexing comment here that needs to be understood. “Hashem got a master (Pharaoh) angry at his servants (the butler and baker) to raise up Yosef and Hashem got servants (Bigson and Seresh) angry at their master (Achashveirosh) to bring greatness to Mordechai.” What do the two have to do with one another and what is this all about?! We also find a Midrash regarding Megillas Esther (Esther Rabbah, Introduction 9) that states: “Hashem made a master (Achashveirosh) kill his wife (Vashti) on the advise of his loved one (Haman) and then He made a master (Achashveirosh) kill his loved one (Haman) on the advise of his wife (Esther).” What is this all about?

The answer lies not in what Yosef did or said, but rather in what he was thinking in his heart when he said it. Bereishis Rabbah (89:3) says that “praiseworthy is one who relies on Hashem and does not turn to haughtiness and false avenues (Tehillim 40:5).” Yosef had every right and in fact was required to ask the butler for help; the fault lies in what he was thinking in his heart when he made his request. If he would have thought how Hashem is the Only One that can save him, then this would have been a great deed. He however forgot himself and was thinking that the butler was his only way out. Hashem was strict with Yosef and gave him two more years in jail so that he could contemplate and deeply come to terms with the reality that only the Will of Hashem comes to prevail. Yosef grew tremendously from this lesson and in fact the first words that he uttered upon leaving jail were a deceleration of Hashem’s rulership and greatness. Pharoah asked Yosef, “I heard that you interpret dreams?” Yosef replied, “It is not I, Hashem will grant me the wisdom to do so (Bereishis 41:16).”

The above quoted Midrashim focus on the theme of reversed roles. They show the power of Hashem to do what He wants in a manner that He pleases. He can move a king or simpleton in any way and for any purpose, even contradictory roles. That is the entire lesson of Megillas Esther, “V’nahapoch Hu, it was revered (Esther 9:1),” a day that was intended by the enemy to be one of destruction of the Jews was miraculously flipped to be a day of victory, inspiration and celebration for the Jews.

Indeed, if we wish to have blessings in life we are taught to give credit to Hashem Who is the source of all blessings. When we turn to Him and recognize that He is the One behind all of our bounty, we have uplifted and elevated our lives. He may use other messengers to deliver goods, but we must not get distracted by the mask. We strive to only pray to Him for our needs. We are sure to thank Hashem for all of gifts and bounty in any way that He delivers them.

Modern-Day Ransoms: Too High a Price?

A Halachic Perspective

by Rabbi Yehoshua Pfeffer

One of the most tragic and delicate halahcic questions of the modern day, which must be addressed both by halachic decisors and by political leaders of the State of Israel, is the question of redeeming soldiers or civilians that are taken hostage by terrorist groups. Invariably, the demands of terrorists include the release of imprisoned terrorists, who generally await their return to their former profession. What does halachah have to say on this matter? Can the monetary ransom demanded by conventional captors be compared with the modern-day requests for release of terrorists? Indeed, how would the demand for monetary payment be seen in today’s halachic eye. Inspired by this week’s parashah, which chronicles the most famous case of ‘kidnapping’ in the history of the world–the sale of Yosef to Egypt–we seek to address these issues in this week’s article.

Our Parashah includes the description of what is surely the most famous ‘kidnapping’ in history: The snatching of Yosef by his brothers, and his subsequent sale to the Egypt-bound group of Ishmaelites. It was this fateful episode that led to the descent of our entire nation to Egypt, the exile and hardships it went on to experience, and, ultimately, the miraculous redemption in the hands of God.

We will take the opportunity to dwell on the halachic aspects of captors and captives, and, in particular, the delicate questions of how to react to captors’ demands for ransoms in exchange for freeing their prisoner.

Throughout the generations, both halachic and historical literature reveal how Jews, in their various countries of exile, suffered greatly from bandits, who found a way to make easy income by capturing Jews and demanding exorbitant ransom money. At certain times, this ploy for making money was employed not only by vagabond anarchists, but even by state machinery. State coffers could be filled by fabricating legal cases against Jews, in order to demand money for their release.

Today, the question of redeeming captives remains tragic, difficult, and very delicate. Instead of money, the demand of modern kidnappers, namely terrorist groups who capture soldiers or civilians, is the release of terrorists.

This, of course, presents a terrible dilemma to decision-makers: The life and freedom of every Jew is priceless, but practically, how much should we be prepared to pay? Is the release of murderers, who are most likely to return to their previous ‘occupation’, justified halachically? In this article we will try and discuss this question.

Paying More than the Captive’s Value

The Gemara teaches that the mitzvah of redeeming captives from their captivity is a “great mitzvah,” a term reserved for only a number of mitzvos. Based on its unique importance, the redemption of captives is given first priority when allocating charity money. In the words of Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 252:1), “No mitzvah is as great as the redemption of captives.”

The Gemara also highlights the dire plight of the captive, who finds himself at the mercy of his captors, who are liable to torture him, place him through unspoken suffering, and even kill him. Shulchan Aruch (252:3) thus writes that he who is able to redeem a captive, yet fails to do so, is considered to be a murderer.

Nevertheless, the Mishnah (Gittin 45a) teaches that captives should not redeem for any price: “Captives are not redeemed for more than their value.” The reason for this is discussed by the Gemara, which mentions two possible reasons. One is that it would prove too weighty a load on the community. According to this reason, a private individual is permitted to redeem his own family or loved ones, even for great sums of money.

Another suggested reason, is that payment of large sums of money would encourage captors to continue in their evil ways, taking as many captives as possible, for the purpose of making quick and easy riches. According to this rationale, even a private individual would not be permitted to use his personal wealth in order to pay exorbitant sums for the release of his relatives.

Exceptions to the Rule

The Rishonim mention a number of exceptions to this rule. One example, as Tosafos (Gittin 45a) writes, is based on a Gemara which obligates a husband to ransom his wife (on the first occasion that she is taken captive) for a great sum of money. As Tosafos explains, the reason for this is that a person’s wife is considered his own self, and regarding to a person’s own self, no limitation was made on the size of the ransom he may pay.

Tosafos also cite an anecdote mentioned in the Gemara (Gittin 58a), which describes how one of the Tanaim ransomed a child—in whom he saw tremendous potential—for “any sum that [the captors] demand.” According to one explanation offered by Tosafos, the reason why this was permitted was because of the great potential that the child displayed. Indeed, the child grew up to be the great Rabbi Yishmael ben Elisha. As Ramban writes, money is a replaceable commodity, but Torah scholars are irreplaceable. When it comes to Torah scholars, any sum of money is legitimate to procure their release.

According to another explanation of Tosafos, it was permitted to ransom the child for a great sum because the conditions at the time of the Destruction were so dire, that encouragement of the threatening non-Jews could make matters no worse than they already were.

Elsewhere, Tosafos (Gittin 58a) write another reason for this. An exorbitant ransom may be paid when there is an imminent danger to the captive’s life. Ramban disagrees with this explanation, claiming that all cases of captivity involve a danger to the captive’s life, yet ransoming for exorbitant sums remains prohibited. However, as we will see below, a number of halachic authorities do adopt the explanation given by Tosafos.

Halachic Rulings

A number of Rishonim, including Rambam, who is followed by Shulchan Aruch (252:4), rule that the rationale behind the above mentioned prohibition is because we are concerned lest we encourage captors to continue their ways. Shulchan Aruch also rules a number of the exceptions cited above: A person is permitted to redeem himself for large sums, and it is likewise permitted to ransom a Torah scholar, or somebody who is destined (we believe) to become a Torah scholar, for sums beyond his value.

Yam Shel Shlomo (Gittin, chap. 5, no. 66) rules that the rationale behind the prohibition of ransoming for exorbitant sums is the immediate strain this places on the community. Based on this rationale, he explains the custom of a number of communities to actually pay disproportionate ransoms. The reason for this is that the community has a right to ignore and overlook the strain and difficulty of raising the necessary funds.

Yam Shel Shomo adds that in circumstances that present immediate danger to the captive’s life, it is permitted (and obligatory) to ransom a captive even for disproportionate sums. Significantly, he also adds (no. 72) that this is the accepted custom.

Based on his outlook on the issue, Yam Shel Shomo questions the legendary behavior of Maharam of Ruttenburg, who refused to allow his community to ransom him from captivity, and ultimately died in the hands of his captors. His status as a leading Torah scholar should surely have been reason enough to permit his ransoming, even at a great expense. In addition, the captivity endangered his life, and this should also have been a reason to allow for his ransoming, even for disproportionate sums.

What is a Person’s Value?

We have seen that it is forbidden, in principle, to ransom a person for more than his value. What, however, is a person’s value?

In times of old, the definition of a person’s value could be calculated with relative ease, based on the slave market. Maharam of Lublin writes (no. 15) that it is prohibited to ransom a person for more than his value on the slave market. In the absence of a local slave market, the value of a person can be ascertained by comparison to a slave market elsewhere.

Today, however, there are virtually no slave markets anywhere, and the question of how to estimate a person’s value must be raised. Addressing the question of why it is customary to ransom captives for more than their value, without discerning between elderly or young, Radvaz (vol. 1, no. 40) explains that a person’s value should not be determined in the slave market, but rather according to the norm for ransoming captives. In other words, Jewish captives should not be ransomed for a higher sum than equivalent non-Jewish captives. It is interesting to note that Radvaz ends stating the fact of Jews being willing to spend far more than non-Jews on ransoming their captives, and greatly praises this quality.

Nowadays, even the yardstick given by Radvaz is hard to employ, in view of the scarcity of monetary ransoms demanded in today’s world. Because of this difficulty, Rav Shaul Israeli (Chavas Binyanim, shaar 2, no. 15) wrote that today any sum of money would be considered more than the value of the captive, and one should not pay anything as ransom money for a captive.

This opinion, however, comes over as being somewhat extreme, and it would seem more likely that each case must be judged according to individual circumstances, the general rule being that one should not pay (much) more than non-Jews would for the freedom of non-Jewish captives.

Freeing Terrorists: The Danger Element

In the State of Israel today, the ransom that captors are demanding in exchange for captives is not financial, but human. The demand for the freeing of terrorists from Israeli prisons introduces a new, hitherto unexplored element into the question of redeeming captives. Is it permitted to free dangerous prisoners, who are in all likelihood waiting to return to their murderous practices, for the sake of releasing Jewish captives?

One approach to this question is to view it as entering a state of potential danger for the sake of alleviating an immediate, definite danger to the captive’s life. Halachic authorities dispute the halachah of saving another’s life at the expense of placing oneself in a state of potential danger: Some (Hagaos Maimonios, Rotzeach 1:15) maintain that one is obligated to do so, while others (Sema, no. 426) maintain that one is not obligated to do so. Indeed, Radvaz (vol. 3, no. 627) goes so far as to label such a rescue as an act of folly. Freeing terrorists would also seem to fit the category of exchanging a definite danger for a potential danger, which would invoke the dispute of authorities mentioned above.

Nevertheless, we find an explicit ruling in the words of Gilyon Maharsha (Yoreh De’ah 157), who writes that “if somebody is taken captive, and it is known that if he is redeemed, another will be taken in his stead, it is forbidden to redeem him… however, if there is a doubt as to whether the other will be taken captive, we do not abandon the definite captive because of the doubt.” In other words, we should not refrain from redeeming somebody in certain danger because of a potential danger in the future.

This ruling, whereby a possible danger for the future does not defer a certain danger at the present, is also given by Rabbi Ovadya Yosef (Yabia Omer, vol. 10, no. 6).

Freeing Terrorists: Too High a Price?

An additional way in which to analyze the question is by comparison with the halachah whereby one may not pay too high a price for redeeming captives. Is the freeing of terrorists too high a price? Does this not encourage terrorist groups to take more captives, thus causing the release of more imprisoned terrorists?

Addressing this issue, we find an interesting ruling in the writings of Rabbi Shaul Israeli (Chavas Binyanim, loc. cit.). In his opinion, “Soldiers that are sent to military service by the State, for the defense of the people, do so under a non-written yet plainly obvious agreement that the State will do all that is in its powers (within reason) to redeem them in case they fall into captivity… This is an obligation that the State accepts upon itself in exchange for the military service, and therefore, it is considered as though the State is redeeming itself, and the restriction of paying more than the captive’s value does not apply. “

According to Rabbi Israeli, the redemption of soldiers from captivity is comparable to a person’s redemption of himself, or of his wife, which, as we saw above, is not bound by the restriction of too high a price. In this light, Rabbi Israeli rules that the State must be ready to free terrorists, for the sake of returning captured soldiers, for no price (within reason) is too great.

There is room, however, to question the comparison between a person’s redemption of his own self, which Chazal did not wish to restrain, and the redemption of a single person by the entire community—and in this case, by the entire country. The rationale, though perhaps plausible, is certainly arguable.

Rabbi Ovadyah Yosef (op. cit.) relies on a different approach in tackling the question of “At what price?” He quotes a number of halachic authorities who rule that in cases where a captive’s life is in tangible danger, it is permitted to redeem him at any price. As we saw above, this is the opinion of Tosafos and Yam Shel Shlomo, to which Rabbi Yosef adds a number of poskim (see also Pischei Teshuvah 252:4). Based on this principle, he concludes that it is permitted to release terrorists for the sake of redeeming Jewish captives, whose presence in the claws of terrorist organization is certainly an imminent danger to their lives.

It is important to note that it will sometimes be necessary to consider additional, extra-halachic factors, in weighing the difficult decision of freeing prisoners for the sake of redeeming captives. One such factor is the national morale, which can have far-reaching consequences; another is national honor, which borders on the issue of chilul Hashem; a third issue is the motivation of high-school graduates for military service, a matter not to be taken lightly in the State of Israel. These factors have a place in the halachic debate, because their ramifications can be far reaching, even if we cannot point to them in a concrete sense.

We end with a prayer: May we speedily see “sons returning to their borders,” and may the difficult and tragic halachic debates we have raised never enter the realm of real-life application.

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This article was copied with permission from www.dinonline.org.

Rabbi Yehoshua Pfeffer is one of the Rabbanim who answers halachic questions for DIN – The International Beis Hora’ah. He can be reached at yehoshuapfeffer@gmail.com. You may send in your halachic questions and queries to  www.dinonline.org

The Torah tells us that Yosef would bring evil reports about his brothers to their father (Beraishis 37:2). Rashi lists three evil reports: the brothers 1) would consume the limb torn from an animal that was still alive 2) would humiliate the sons of the maidservants, 3) were suspected of committing illicit relations. The Sifsei Chachomim asks how could it be that the children of Yaakov were suspected of such transgressions?  He goes on to explain that Yosef was surely mistaken in his conclusions against his brothers, and elaborates on each deed.

Yosef observed his brothers eating from an animal that was still shaking after slaughter. The Torah tells us that it is prohibited to partake of the flesh of a live animal (Devarim 12:23). Tosafos Chullin:2b “Uv’mukdashin” explains that when an animal is quivering after slaughter it is considered alive. The Tosafos goes on to explain that since both trachea, and esophagus have been severed it is considered to be fit for consumption. However there is an opinion that disagrees, considering it to be flesh of a live animal in regards to food. With this we can understand what occurred. Yosef was of the opinion that the animal was considered still alive, and therefore they were not allowed to partake of the flesh. The brothers held that it was “completely” slaughtered and fit to eat.

The brothers referred to the children of Bilah and Zilpah as sons of maidservants. These were not meant to be derogatory comments, rather statements of objective fact. Yosef thought they meant to say that the children of Bilah and Zilpah were born before they were freed servants, making their children Canaanite slaves. However, this was not the case.

Finally, Yosef accused them of having illicit relationships. The reasoning behind this accusation is that it says a person should not become too close to a woman.  When Yosef observed them doing business with women, he assumed that they had other dealings with them as well. He was mistaken though, for he thought becoming close to a woman was meant literally. However, the correct interpretation is only things that generate closeness are forbidden with the opposite gender.

In his mistake, Yosef was punished measure for measure. The brothers slaughtered an animal when they threw him into the pit, and did not eat it “live”. For his misinterpretation of the “maidservants’” children, he was sold as a slave. Lastly, because of his false assumptions, the wife of Potifar set her eyes on him with immoral intent (Beraishis 39:7).

One of the things we can learn from the second and third report is the importance of judging our fellow man favorably. When the “facts” are set in front of you so clearly, don’t be too quick to jump to any conclusions, for you may be mistaken. A modern day story illustrates how our eyes can play tricks on us, and things aren’t always the way they seem. There was once a person traveling with a friend. As they approached a school building, she noticed children playing on the fenced roof. She detected several gaping openings in the fence, and started to rant and rave about the lack of responsibility the school had for student safety.  As they drew closer, she spotted securely welded white wrought iron bars over the “holes”. Her eyes had deceived her into thinking negatively about the school and its staff. With deeper inspection her assumptions had become unfounded.

Sometimes it is just a prank that our eyes play on us. There are other scenarios where the ramifications are much larger, leading to exceedingly negative effects.  We must be careful to not let our judgments backfire, for this can lead to a very unpleasant singe.

Last week’s Parsha ended with a list of Eisav’s elaborate descendants. Scores of kings and families are mentioned. This is contrasted by the opening verse of this week’s Parsha which only mentions Yaakov as the father of Yosef. Rashi (Bereishis 37:1) is perplexed by this comparison and brings down the famous Midrash which explains the lesson.

There once was a faithful blacksmith. One day, an evil salesman entered the city and began to bring in camel-loads of flax to sell. He quickly took over the city with disregard for the fact that his flax was infringing on people’s private property. As the camels poured in, the streets were completely filled with flax. The blacksmith was very concerned that he would lose business as his store was no longer visible. A wise man pointed out to him, “do not fear, one spark will fly out from your anvil and burn down the myriads of flax!” So too when Yaakov saw all of the multitudes of Eisav, he was scared. Hashem however reassured him, “do not fear! You are like fire and Yosef is like the traveling flame, he will destroy all of Eisav’s masses. (This is referring to the time of Mashiach and in general to the fact that Yosef’s trait of self-control combats Eisav’s passion for sin.)

I have always thought it interesting that the blacksmith specifically took down the flax merchant by way of one “accidental” spark. The blacksmith spends his day making metal weapons and hard objects. However, he did not use those weapons to subdue the flax or its owner. Rather it was from the spark that shot out of his swing that won the war. This is to show us that so many times in life, we do not gain victory or success by natural means or from our personal plans. Our job is to put in effort and to try our best; ultimately Hashem is the One Who delivers success. He waits for our efforts and that is where success emanates from, sometimes from the most surprising places, like a shooting spark!

“Many ideas are planned in man’s heart (לב), but the counsel of Hashem is what prevails (Mishley 19:21).” The heart is the center of human emotions. When the heart recognizes that Hashem is in full control, that is the ultimate achievement of wisdom. However, before that point, man ineffectively thinks that his own strength (כח) is what brings him success.

The human hand contains 14 joints (3 on each finger and 2 on the thumb). Thus both hands combined contain 28 joints. This hints to the natural reliance one has on his own strength and hands (כ”ח (literally: strength) =28). However, when the Kohen pronounces the Priestly Benediction, he spread his hands into four parts representing the four letters of Hashem’s name. This adds 4 to the 28 thus totaling 32 (=לב), the deep and emotional recognition that Hashem runs the world.

The Kabbalists write that man has 28 teeth plus four additional molars, totaling 32 (לב). The number twenty-eight hints to Koheles (Chapter 3) where Shlomo enumerates twenty-eight varied human actions and emotions that fill the average life-span. A time for… birth, death, laughter, crying, war and peace, etc. The complete gamut of life stages, the natural world. The purpose of the Jew is to add the recognition of Hashem’s presence (represented by the four letters of Hashem’s name) and guidance into all his endeavors. This is the significance of the “wisdom teeth”. They are the additional four molars that bring the teeth total to 32 (לב). The Kabbalists write that the 32 teeth correspond to the 32 paths of wisdom which are found in the Torah and can be contained in one’s heart. The teeth represent the ultimate wisdom (just as teeth dissect food and effect expression, so too wisdom is the dissection and expression of knowledge). The knowledge and security of knowing that Hashem is in full control of our destiny is true wisdom that brings warm feelings to one’s heart and a beautiful smile to one’s face!d the ultimate greatness in life!

“והוא נער את בני בלהה ואת בני זלפה…” (לז:א).

“He (Yosef) befriended the sons of Bilhah and Zilpah” (37:1).

Rashi tells us that the sons of Yaakov were disrespectful of their four brothers born from Yaakov’s secondary wives (Dan, Naftoli, Gad, Asher) and called them, “sons of the maidservants”. Yosef was very unhappy with this disrespect and so he reported it to his father and made an effort to help out and befriend them.

What is quite impossible to understand is that despite this effort, they still sold him!? Ten brothers were involved in his sale and this included the four sons of Bilhah and Zilbah! The very four people whom Yosef dedicated his efforts to protect and care for?! More so, they were the ones who brought the Yosef’s bloody garment to Yaakov to inform him that Yosef had been “killed”. How could they do this to him after all that he did for them?!

Let us rewind to an earlier episode and draw a powerful lesson from it, which I believe answers this question as well. Rachel requested of her sister, Leah, that she please provide her with the Dudaim (mandrakes) which were a known remedy to help her have children. Leah screamed at her and said (Bereishis 30:15), “is it not enough that you stole my husband; now you want to take my Dudaim as well?!” Rachel then made a tradeoff with her, and never challenged those words.

The question is, this is preposterous, how could Leah speak this way? Rachel was the one who gave up the Simanim (prearranged secret “password” that Yaakov made up with Rachel to ensure that he was marring her) to Leah in order that she shouldn’t be embarrassed and could marry Yaakov in her place. What was Leah saying?!

The most amazing answer that emerges is that: somehow in Rachel’s giving over the Simanim to Leah, Rachel did it in such a way that Leah never even knew the kindness that was done for her! You may want to read that again! Perhaps Rachel approached Leah before the wedding and said, Yaakov asked me to teach you these Simanim etc. Absolutely amazing!

So too, Rachel taught this to her son Yosef. She instilled in him a passion for chessed and the dedication to care for others regardless of whether they were aware of the favor they were receiving. (How this lesson ties into the meaning of Yosef’s name is for you to figure out!)

This is how it was possible for the four brothers to be involved in the sale of Yosef. They weren’t even aware of all that Yosef did for them. The ultimate chessed is that which has no expectations of recognition in return.

I mentioned earlier that TEN brothers were involved in the sale of Yosef. The Seforim say that the incident of the Ten Martyrs (Asarah Harugey Malchus) took place as an atonement for the TEN people involved in the sale of Yosef. However, this needs to be understood. We know that Yaakov had twelve sons. Three of them were not involved in the sale! Binyomin wasn’t there, Reuven was away at the time, and Yosef didn’t sell himself! In that case, only nine people were involved, who is the tenth?

Here are three approaches:

1- Shlah explains that since Reuven initially agreed to throw Yosef into the pit (and to sell him), he was held accountable even though he wasn’t present at the actual sale.

2- Others state that Yosef himself was held accountable because of his actions that caused the brothers’ animosity as well.

3- Arizal (word of caution: this needs to be understood properly) states that Hashem Himself had joined in the Beis Din to allow the brothers to sell Yosef and thus He desired atonement for Himself as well. Rabbi Akiva was the martyr who died for Hashem. This is why his soul departed with the word “Echad, The Holy One”.

“He (Yosef) refused (to live with Potifar’s wife)” (39:8). “וַיְמָאֵ֓ן… (לט:ח).”

It is interesting to note the trop, reading note, found on this word, the shalsheles, שלש֓לת. This note is only found in four places in the entire Torah. Let us glean an interesting lesson hinted from this.

The four places are as follows:

1- In Parshas Vayera, ויתמהמה, Lot tarried when the Angels were trying to evacuate

him from Sedom.

2- In Parshas Chayeh Sarah, ויאמר, when Eliezer, the servant of Avraham, prayed for

Hashem to guide him in finding a wife for Yitzchok.

3- In this Parsha, וימאן, when Yosef refused to sin with his master’s wife.

4- In Parshas Tzav, וישחט, regarding the slaughtering of one of the sacrificial animals. What is the common thread between these four occurrences of this unique trop, the shalsheles?

The word shalsheles means “long chain.” It is read with a long thrice-repeating- tune to connote consistency and continuance. It hints to the Yetzer Hara, the Evil Urge! How so? The Gemara in Berachos (61a) compares the Yetzer Hara to a pesky fly. He continually tries to get one to sin throughout ones’ entire life. We rise to the challenge, but he always lurks waiting to get us again! This is his constant presence, trying to chain us down! Additionally, just as the shalsheles has three parts to it, so too the Gemara in Bava Basra (16a) tells us that the Yetzer Hara has three names.

Now we can plug this in to explain the story line hinted by the tune’s four occurrences.

1-”And he said”- The Yetzer Hara speaks to us by planting a bad idea in our mind…

2-”And he refused!”- Our job is to cut off his words and not to listen…

3-”And he tarried”- If however one hesitates and gives himself time to slip…

4-”He slaughtered”- then he has you in his hands! You’re gone!

The lesson to learn from Yosef is how to fight and win. When you see that a course of action is correct and just, grab on to it and do not delay to pursue that action. If however a course of action is not correct, then stop immediately and do not hesitate! This is how successful people live their lives, no delays!